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This paper makes a fresh attempt at characterizing optimal commodity taxes. 
Under the usual assumptions, an extremely simple expression of second-best 
commodity taxes is derived, showing tax rates as functions of observable 
variables only, rather than as functions of unobservable variables such as 
compensated cross elasticities. The main formula is independent of special 
preferences, and independent of the number of commodities. It has a simple 
economic meaning and could be particularly useful for empirical research. 
Examples and remarks on the normalization problem are provided. 
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For more than one and a half centuries, economists have been trying to character-
ize commodity taxes which minimize the excess burden of taxation. Ramsey
(1927) surmounted the partial equilibrium framework of Dupuit (1844) and oth-
ers, laying the foundation for the modern treatment. Research on this topic is still
continuing, and if one takes to hand a contemporary textbook
1 or a recent survey
2
in order to pick up the fruits of these efforts, it turns out that the theory of public
finance essentially offers three answers to the question as to how a policy maker
should set commodity taxes optimally. However, each of the three answers has so
severe shortcomings that they are almost useless for practical purposes. In the
order of decreasing popularity
3, the answers have become known as the Ramsey
rule, the inverse elasticity rule, and the Corlett-Hague rule. Let us review these
briefly.
—  The Ramsey rule characterizes optimal changes in consumption, stating that
optimal taxes diminish all demands in the same proportion. In fact, this inter-
pretation holds only approximately in the neighbourhood of zero tax revenue.
—  According to the inverse elasticity rule, optimal commodity tax rates are in-
versely proportional to elasticities of demand. This presupposes a very special
form of the utility function and is far from a general result.
—  Finally, the Corlett-Hague rule yields a substantive conclusion for any well-
behaved preferences. It states that in a setting with two consumption goods
and leisure, precisely that good which is more complementary with leisure
should be taxed at a higher rate. But unfortunately, we live in a world with
considerably more than two commodities.
This paper makes a fresh attempt at characterizing optimal commodity taxes.
Concentrating on efficiency issues and thus adopting a framework with identical
consumers
4 , a very simple rule for optimal commodity taxes will be derived. This
rule holds independently of special assumptions on preferences, and independ-
ently of the number of commodities. It entails an explicit formula for optimal tax
rates in terms of observable variables. Regarding empirical applications, an ex-
plicit solution in terms of observable variables seems important and useful; after
all, the fact that most traditional results are formulated in terms of compensated
                                                
1 E. g. Myles (1995). 
2 E. g. Auerbach and Hines (2002).
3 To get an approximate measure of popularity, I performed an internet search which, at the
time it was conducted, entailed over 1.000 hits for “Ramsey rule”, roughly 500 hits for “in-
verse elasticity rule” and less than 100 hits for “Corlett-Hague rule”. 
4 For a recent treatment of distributional aspects of commodity taxation, see Coady and Drèze
(2002). 3
elasticities is often considered as an eminent obstacle for putting the theory into
practice.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the standard approach in a
nutshell, in order to facilitate comparison with the new approach. Section 3 con-
tains our principal result. A general complementarity rule is derived in section 4.
Some examples are provided in section 5. Section 6 considers optimal commodity
taxes in the presence of an additional wage tax, and section 7 concludes. The
appendix clarifies some minor points of rigour.
The common underlying framework is this one, where all symbols in bold face
represent n-vectors: Consumers maximize utilities u(x, y) by selecting a pair of
consumption x and effort y from a given consumption set C, subject to the budget
constraint y≥qx and at given consumer prices q. Gross and net wage rates being
normalized to unity, y represents earnings in monetary units as well as effort in
hours. Forming a Lagrangean L=u(x,  y)+µ(y–qx) and differentiating it with
respect to the choice variables gives
(1) µ
y




∂    and     q
x
µ .
2. CHARACTERIZING OPTIMAL QUANTITIES
The prevailing dual approach does not aim to describe optimal taxes, but seeks to
characterize optimal quantities. It employs ordinary demand functions x(q) which,
under suitable assumptions on preferences, are defined for any q>>0. The adding-
up restriction defines an earnings function y(q)=qx(q) and entails the Cournot
aggregation ∂y/∂q=x+q∂x/∂q. Using consumer prices as controls, the govern-
ment maximizes utilities subject to the revenue constraint tx≥g, where g is an
exogenous revenue requirement, t=q–p are the commodity taxes, and p repre-
sents given producer prices
5. Differentiating L=u(x(q), y(q))+λ(tx(q)–g) with
respect to the controls yields
























since ∂t/∂q=I. This leads to the uncompensated version of the Ramsey rule, if we





µ λ − − =
∂
∂ .
Ramsey (1927) assumed utility to be quasi-linear in effort. Then, as there are no
income effects, the expression on the left involves a symmetric matrix and may be
                                                
5 It is well-known that all results remain unchanged in case of endogenous producer prices. 4
re-written as ∂x/∂qt. According to the mean-value theorem, this equals the
changes in demands, dx, when taxes are increased from zero to dt. Hence, all
demands are diminished by a common factor.
In the presence of income effects, one can use the Slutsky decomposition to obtain
the compensated version of the Ramsey rule, originally developed by Samuelson
(1951). For some negative constant k and the Slutzky matrix S, this reads: 
(4) x t S k = .
Optimal taxes diminish the compensated demands by a common factor. Using
Mirrlees’ (1976) term “index of discouragement” for ΣjSijtj/xi, the Ramsey rule
asserts that the index of discouragement should be the same for all goods.
3. CHARACTERIZING OPTIMAL TAXES
The primal approach seeks to characterize optimal taxes rather than optimal
quantities. It uses inverse demand functions q(x) defined for all x∈D, where D
denotes the image of the demand function x(q). Now, the adding-up restriction
defines an offer curve y(x)=q(x)x and entails the inverse Cournot aggregation
∂y/∂x=x∂q/∂x+q. To understand what this means, observe that the government,
by selecting appropriate prices, can induce consumers to choose any consumption
plan x∈D. In so doing, however, the government must ensure that consumers
remain on their offer curves. In this sense, earnings are a function of consumption,
and the derivative ∂y/∂xi indicates the response of earnings to a small change in xi.
The taxes follow from the identity t(x)=q(x)–p which implies ∂t/∂x=∂q/∂x.
Taking the quantities as controls, the government maximizes utilities subject to
the revenue constraint. Differentiating the Lagrangean L=u(x, y(x))+λ(t(x)x–g)
with respect to the controls, we obtain:




















By using (1) and the inverse Cournot aggregation, this becomes
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Comparison with (3) highlights the duality of the two approaches in a particularly
nice fashion. Apart from this aesthetic virtue, the inverse Ramsey rule is as use-
less as the Ramsey rule itself. However, performing a simple operation that has no5
analogue in the dual approach, one can substitute ∂y/∂x–q for x∂q/∂x, using again


























The first version is more useful when it comes to applications, as will be shown
below. From a theoretical point of view, the second version is more satisfactory
because producer prices are exogenous. To get to grips with it, consider a mar-
ginal increase in some consumption xi. This move costs pi in a first-best context,
but pi–∂y/∂xi in a second-best context, because this difference represents the de-
rivative of t(x)x with respect to xi. As the tax ti itself can be interpreted as the
marginal revenue from slightly increasing xi, formula (9) equates marginal reve-
nues and marginal costs multiplied by a uniform constant. The crucial elements in
determining optimal taxes are the derivatives ∂y/∂xi which indicate the responses
of earnings to changes in the respective consumptions. Owing to the minus sign,
the rule asserts that commodities which stimulate earnings should be taxed at low
rates, and vice versa.
Before concluding this section, some historical remarks are in order. The first
economist adopting the primal approach to optimal commodity taxation was, of
course, Ramsey himself, who worked in the Marshallian tradition of what we
today call inverse demand. Indeed, Ramsey’s central equation (3) is an archaic
form of (7). Assuming ∂q/∂x to be symmetric and taxes to be infinitesimal, he
used it to derive his principal result “that optimal taxes diminish the production of
all commodities in the same proportion” (Ramsey 1927, p. 54). Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1972) also used a primal approach, treating earnings as an additional
control and putting the condition (1) that consumers remain on their offer curves
as an additional restriction into the Lagrangean. This facilitates describing optimal
taxes in terms of the bordered Hessian of the utility function. Deaton (1979) es-
sentially decomposed (7) into compensated prices changes and inverse income
effects, using the distance function and the Antonelli matrix, which is a general-
ized inverse of the Slutsky matrix. Comparing these approaches in an elegant
survey, Stern (1986) pointed out that the analyst has the choice between three
different matrices: Slutsky, Hessian or Antonelli. The strategy followed above
was not to add yet a fourth matrix type, but to let matrices completely disappear
from the scene. This entails the simple vector equations (8) and (9) which are easy
to interpret in economic terms, as we shall see.6
4. A PERFECTLY GENERAL COMPLEMENTARITY RULE
Equation (8) describes optimal taxes in terms of three observable variables,
namely, consumer prices, earnings and consumption. To elucidate its economic







The index of encouragement indicates the response of earnings to an increase in
the respective expenditure. It may be positive, negative or zero. Dividing some

















This states that commodities with a high index of encouragement should be taxed
at low rates, and vice versa. To illustrate this proposition, consider brandy and
coffee. Brandy is likely to reduce earnings, at least if consumed in larger quanti-
ties. If this is true, brandy has a negative index of encouragement, and (11) sug-
gests taxing it at a relatively high rate. By the same token, as long as coffee has a
positive impact on earnings, the coffee tax should be low.
The economic logic behind these findings is as follows. Consumers have positive
endowments of leisure which, by assumption, cannot be taxed directly. Com-
modities with a high index of encouragement induce consumers to supply large
portions of their endowments in the market. A government restricted to taxing
only market demands will stimulate the consumption of such goods since this
broadens the tax base. Note, the impossibility of taxing leisure endowments is the
driving force behind second-best taxes
6. Without this restriction, the government
could establish a first-best tax system consisting of a tax on the endowments only.
The literature sometimes confounds untaxed endowments with untaxed market
demands. Clearly, any market demand can be taken as untaxed, because only
relative prices matter. For a clarification of this point, see Stern (1986, p. 298) and
section 6 below.























                                                
6 The implicit assumption that leisure is the only good with an untaxable endowment is not
restrictive. If there were several such goods, these could be combined into a single Hicksian
composite, since the government cannot change their relative prices by hypothesis.7
The symbols on the right-hand side represent the compensated cross elasticities.





yj, i.e. if an increase in the i-th price induces a stronger compensated
increase in earnings, or decrease in leisure, as compared with an increase in the j-
th price. Equating (11) and (12) shows that commodity i is stronger complemen-
tary with leisure if and only if its index of encouragement is lower. In this sense,
our approach generalizes the Corlett-Hague rule, which holds only in the presence
of just two commodities, whereas (11) holds for arbitrarily many commodities.
Moreover, the new rule involves observable variables instead of compensated
cross elasticities that are hard to estimate, and is much easier to derive.
However, the most important advantage of the generalized complementarity rule
lies in the economic intuition it provides. Let us consider three concrete com-
modities: cinema visits, watches and newspapers, in order to see what the tradi-
tional approach has to tell us regarding their optimal tax treatment. According to
Sandmo (1987, p. 89), who worked out the deepest interpretations of the tradi-
tional approach, the “set of taxes should be chosen so as to make the role of sub-
stitution effects as small as possible”. This is in perfect accordance with prevail-
ing intuition, but what does it mean, either mathematically or with respect to the
three aforementioned commodities? In mathematical terms, the statement is empty
because optimal taxes by no means minimize some norm of the Slutsky matrix.
Practically, the statement is empty, too, except in the accustomed special cases of
two goods or vanishing cross elasticities.
Using the present approach, one could argue as follows: Cinema visits or other
time consuming hobbies are likely to reduce earnings. Therefore, they should be
taxed at relatively high rates. On the other hand, it appears difficult to say some-
thing useful about the relationship between watches and earnings. According to
the principle of sufficient reason, these should be taxed at the normal rate. Finally,
reading newspapers has presumably a positive impact on earnings in a knowledge
society, which suggests taxing them at a reduced rate. The latter recommendation
holds also with respect to all kinds of work related expenditures. These are often
deductible under the earnings tax, a feature equivalent to zero tax rates in a pure
excise tax system. The preceding examples were chosen with an eye to actual tax
provisions which, of course, are quite diverse among countries. Anyway, it ap-
pears perfectly sensible to tax commodities with a high index of encouragement at
low rates, because these stimulate labour supply and are hence less costly in a
second-best context. 8
5. EXAMPLES
In this section, we would like to provide some examples by considering concrete
functional forms. All examples presume a leisure endowment equal to unity, so
that 1–y denotes leisure.
1. Cobb-Douglas Utility: Firstly consider the economist’s workhorse
(13) n
n x ... x ) y ( ) y , ( u
α α α ⋅ ⋅ − =
1 0
1 1 x ,
where the numbers αi sum up to unity. The textbook solutions read y=1–α0 and
xi=αi/qi for all i. Changes in any consumption do not affect earnings since all
expenditure shares, including the share of leisure itself, remain constant. The
derivatives ∂y/∂xi vanish for all goods, hence ei=0, and (8) implies taxation at the
uniform rate (λ–µ)/λ.
2. Inverse Elasticity Utility: Next we derive the inverse elasticity rule:
(14) ) x ( u ... ) x ( u y ) y , ( u n n + + + − = 1 1 1 x .
Quasi-linearity in y excludes income effects, so that µ=1. Differentiating the left
equation in (1) yields ∂qi/∂xj=0 for all j≠i, implying ∂y/∂xi=∂qi/∂xixi+qi. There-














from which the inverse elasticity rule ti/qi=–(λ–µ)/λ·∂qi/∂xi·xi/qi follows, written
itself in a somewhat inverse fashion. Standard textbook wisdom declares that
commodities whose demands react stronger to price changes should be taxed at
lower rates because quantity reactions induce excess burdens. Though this is liter-
ally true under the very stringent assumption on preferences made here, such a
view seems misleading. A much more convincing explanation, which already
comes close to the intuition behind (11), was offered by Sandmo (1986, p. 92): If
the compensated cross elasticities ηij vanish for all i≠j, the adding-up property
implies ηyi=ηii. Therefore, taxing a commodity with a high own elasticity of de-
mand entails a strong reduction in earnings, and hence in tax revenue. From this
perspective, the inverse elasticity rule only paraphrases the above contention that
goods whose consumption stimulates earnings should be taxed at low rates. In
fact, the impact on earnings is again the driving force behind the result, and the
utility function (14) presents but a theoretical curiosity, implying a one-to-one
correspondence between individual consumption expenditures on the one hand
and earnings on the other.
3. Weakly Separable Utility: The following assumption covers a broader class of
utility functions.9
(16) ) y ), ( v ( u ) y , ( u x x = ,
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where Euler’s equation v(x)=∂v/∂xx and the identity y=qx have been exploited.
The desired result now follows from differentiating this equation implicitly (dem-
























































The common factor γ is defined by the right-hand equation. As equation (17)
asserts that ∂v/∂xi=–∂u/∂y/(∂u/∂v)qi, the index of encouragement now amounts to
ei=–∂u/∂y/(∂u/∂v)γ. The index does not vanish in general, but is identical across
commodities, implying uniform taxation. In the present case, the marginal rates of
substitution of the consumption goods are independent of earnings, and vice
versa. Therefore, distorting consumption along an indifference hyper-surface
makes the consumption bundle more expensive and leaves earnings unchanged,
which cannot be optimal.
4. Stone-Geary Utility: The last example regards utility functions of the form
(20) n ) x ( ... ) x ( ) y ( ) y , ( u n n
α α α β β − ⋅ ⋅ − − = 1 0
1 1 1 x ,
the numbers αi again summing up to unity. Using  i x ˆ =xi–βi, we are back in the
Cobb-Douglas case and obtain  i x ˆ =αi/qi or qi=αi/(xi– βi), the familiar linear ex-
penditure system. As cross elasticities vanish, ∂y/∂xi=–αixi/(xi– βi)
2+αi/(xi– βi).











As tax rates are proportional to 1–ei, they are increasing in βi. This is often taken
to mean that taxes on basic needs such as food should be high. Considering the
possibility of home production (Sandmo 1990) suggests a somewhat different
interpretation: Tax theory focuses on market demands rather than on consumption10
in the literal sense. If consumers can avoid taxes on specific market demands by
home production, these demands should be taxed moderately. On the other hand,
commodities like portables cannot be produced at home, and taxing them at high
rates forces consumers to increase earnings. Following this interpretation, a high
value of βi indicates that consumers cannot easily dispense with the respective
market demand. Again, the relationship between consumption and earnings is
crucial for the optimal tax rates.
6. THE NORMALIZATION PROBLEM
The above analysis uses the classical framework of a pure excise tax system. This
specific normalization of the consumer price vector, which assumes the absence
of a wage tax, is not as innocuous as it appears, nor does it present a serious ob-
stacle for developing a meaningful theory of optimal commodity taxes. In what
follows, all producer prices are set equal to unity, which can always be done by an
appropriate choice of units. The above analysis involves a vector (q0, q) of con-
sumer prices. As consumption demands and effort are homogenous of degree zero
in (q0, q), the first component of this vector, the consumer price of leisure (or net
wage rate), can also be chosen arbitrarily; and in the above analysis it was set to
unity, implying that earnings remained untaxed. Thus, the variable y represented
both earnings and effort, and we obtained concrete optimal tax rates – which may
be the relevant one in case of a less developed country that raises most tax reve-
nue through excises.
To generalize, let us now write earnings more explicitly as y=q0l, where l repre-
sents effort. Introducing a wage tax means reducing q0 somewhat. With total tax
revenue given, this change does in no way influence the allocation. In the pres-
ence of a single commodity, for instance, it is immaterial whether we set q1=2
and q0=1 (a pure excise tax) or q1=1 and q0=½ (a pure wage tax). But the rela-
tive tax rates described by (11) are not invariant with respect to the normalization.
This finding led Mirrlees (1976) to dismiss altogether the idea of characterizing
optimal tax rates. However, this appears to push the point too far because, once
we know the wage tax rate – and there is nothing to prevent us from doing so – we
can infer the optimal commodity tax rates. These are uniquely defined, relative to
the actual wage tax. The upshot is that calculating relative tax rates becomes pos-
sible once the wage tax is known. As the latter is public knowledge, an applied
economist can easily use it. However, it is important to keep in mind – especially
regarding Europe with its largely harmonized VAT regulations – that optimal
commodity tax rates cannot be determined without regard to the actual mix of
direct and indirect taxation
7.
                                                
7 For a related study of the direct-indirect mix, see Smart (2002). 11
For a theorist not interested in concrete numerical solutions, there is yet an easier
way to cope with the normalization problem. All producer prices having been
normalized to unity, the inequality qi–qj>0 asserts unambiguously that commod-
ity i bears a higher tax than commodity j. The normalization of commodity prices
affects only the size of the difference, not its sign. Substituting ti=qi–1 into (9),
subtracting two such equations and rearranging yields
(22) ( ) j i j i e e q q − − − = −
µ
µ λ .
It remains true that goods are taxed the more heavily, the smaller their index of
encouragement. Indeed, the index of encouragement itself is invariant with re-
spect to the normalization of the commodity price vector, and so is the difference
ei–ej, which provides an abstract measure of relative tax burdens. Normalizations
influence the difference of consumer prices solely through their effects on the
Lagrangean multipliers. Since scaling up the price vector does not affect the sign
of qi–qj, a theorist interested in qualitative properties can forget about normaliza-
tion.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, an alternative route to characterizing second-best commodity taxes
has been developed. It has been shown that optimal tax rates depend directly on
the impact of consumption on earnings. If a higher consumption of a specific good
like coffee induces the consumer to work harder, then this good should be taxed
only moderately. Conversely, time-consuming activities should be taxed heavily.
The intuition behind this result is straight-forward: As the government cannot tax
leisure endowments directly, it should stimulate consumption of precisely the
same goods which induce consumers to work harder. This move increases earn-
ings as the genuine tax base and reduces the average tax rate, since total taxes paid
remain constant. Work-related expenses should be taxed moderately or be made
deductible under a wage tax.
In essence, the new tax rule can be considered as a generalization of the Corlett-
Hague rule. It differs from the latter in three respects: Firstly, it holds for arbitrar-
ily many commodities, and not just in the two-commodities case. Secondly, it
characterizes optimal tax rates in terms of directly observable variables rather than
in terms of unobservable compensated elasticities. And finally, the primal ap-
proach in the form invented here allows deriving expressions of optimal tax rates
in a few lines, whereas the standard method follows a pretty roundabout course: It
starts with characterizing optimal quantities using the dual approach, obtains the
Ramsey rule, and finally re-translates the result into primal terms in order to de-
scribe the optimal tax rates.12
The last section has shown that optimal commodity tax rates can be determined
without ambiguity once the wage tax is known. Since data on earnings, consump-
tion, and prices are readily available, and since a researcher adopting this course
does not need to know the utility function, it remains to be hoped that the ap-
proach proposed here will stimulate empirical research in the field.
APPENDIX
In order to render the mathematics air-tight, it is most convenient to make the
following two assumptions: The utility function is strictly quasi-concave, and
∂x/∂q is negative definite
8. Then, ordinary and inverse functions x(q) and q(x)
exist. The excess demand function is the mapping (q0, q)→[l(q0, q), x(q0, q)],
whose Jacobian determinant vanishes, of course. ∂x/∂q is obtained from the Jaco-
bian by deleting the first row and column. Note that we could also write effort in
the more accustomed notation as –x0 without affecting any of the above results.
The present notation has been adopted because it is more intuitive.
Negative definiteness of ∂x/∂q – the famous “Law of Demand” which essentially
rules out Giffen goods – is often assumed implicitly in optimal tax theory: Under
the dual approach, post-multiplying equation (3) by the tax vector shows that
precisely this assumption entails λ>µ, since tx>0 and µ>0. If the assumption
were violated, λ–µ could become negative, implying that Ramsey taxes increase,
rather than decrease, all uncompensated demands by a common factor. Therefore,
the Law of Demand is the relevant assumption also in case of the dual approach.
Under the primal approach, the relationship λ>µ, which has been used in the in-
terpretations, follows from pre-multiplying equation (7) by the consumption vec-
tor. Moreover, the analysis assumes existence of an optimum, excludes corner
solutions and relies on an appropriate constraint qualification in order to have
necessary optimality conditions.
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which follows from combining equations (1), multiplying by x and using y=qx.
One can easily verify by non-vanishing Jacobian determinants that the offer curve
exists if and only if the inverse demand functions exist, but owing to y(x)=q(x)x,
this is clear anyway. Maximizing consumers’ utilities subject to y–px≥g and (23)
                                                
8 Some would speak of negative quasi-definiteness, because ∂x/∂q is not symmetric in general.
Gale and Nikaido (1965), who proved global existence of inverse demand, would have called
–∂x/∂q a P-matrix. If one only wants local invertibility, the assumption of a regular equilib-
rium suffices.13
is an interesting way to state the optimal commodity tax problem, since taxes do
not enter this formulation either directly or indirectly.
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